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A B S T R A C T
Previous work on the threat-creativity link has mainly used paradigms in which participants had ample time to
generate ideas. However, people under imminent threats have limited time to think of, and select, the single best
response for actual implementation. In three studies, we examined the effect of imminent threats on the gen-
eration and selection of threat responses. Participants facing self-directed or other-directed threats were asked to
select one out of two alternative responses that differed on either originality or usefulness to deal with the
displayed situation (Studies 1 and 2) or think of and decide on, a fitting response themselves (Study 3). They did
so under high or low time pressure (Studies 1–3) and reported their perceived effectiveness of each alternative
response in managing the threats (Study 2). Participants selected and generated useful rather than original
responses. Whereas time pressure did not moderate this effect, threat direction impacted the selection and
generation of imminent threat responses: Self-directed rather than other-directed threats increased the selection
and generation of original and creative responses because original responses were seen as more effective.
Everyday life requires people to effectively deal with various si-
tuations, sometimes even life-threatening situations, such as a crime, an
accident, or a fire. While these threatening situations can have serious
personal consequences, they are of low probability and thus confront
the individual with a novel problem (Gohm, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2001;
Marks & Nesse, 1994). To successfully diminish or avert the negative
consequences of such novel problems, people often respond with useful
yet uncommon solutions (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). For example, in
warfare strategists use deceptive strategies that mislead their oppo-
nents, to combat life-threatening infections medical scientists invent
new treatments, and to protect against terrorist attacks security agents
think of innovative screening methods.
These examples notwithstanding, the effects of threat on creativity
remain poorly understood. Whereas threats, and concomitant fear and
anxiety, are typically associated with reduced creativity and con-
forming behaviors (Byron & Khazanchi, 2011; Griskevicius, Goldstein,
Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Mehta & Zhu, 2009), other work
suggests that people are highly motivated to avoid, and cope with,
threats and selectively focus their attention on relevant information
that is available in the environment and stored in memory (Elliot,
2008). These motivational and cognitive processes, in turn, lead to a
greater number of (creative) ideas that, crucially, pertain especially to
threat-relevant domains (De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008). For instance, when
individuals anticipated a competitive interaction with a hostile oppo-
nent, they generated more original conflict tactics than when they an-
ticipated a cooperative interaction (De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008; also see
Van Leeuwen & Baas, in press), and people came up with quite in-
novative ideas to avert the potential loss of monetary resources (Roskes,
De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2012).
Without exception, the aforementioned studies assessed creativity
using open-ended assessments: Research participants were given ample
time to come up with as many ideas as possible, for example, to settle
negotiations (De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008). Although valid and useful,
ecological validity is putatively low. People under imminent threats
have limited time to think of and select a single fitting response for ac-
tual implementation. In three studies, we therefore examined the effect
of imminent threats on the generation and selection of threat responses.
Our first goal here was to uncover when and why threatened people
select creative responses for actual implementation. This is a non-trivial
issue for three reasons. First, whereas creativity is usually
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operationalized as ideas that are both original and useful
(Runco & Jaeger, 2012), past work identified an inverse relation be-
tween originality and usefulness (Runco & Charles, 1993). Thus, al-
though people benefit most from useful and original responses, they
may have difficulty identifying and selecting truly creative responses.
Therefore, when it comes to responding to threat, people may prefer
useful but unoriginal ideas (cf. Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2012).
Second, whereas idea generation involves the production of alternative
responses, idea selection is a convergent phase that involves a quality
assessment and actual decision-making (Cropley, 2006; Kohn,
Paulus, & Choi, 2011; Runco, 2008). Indeed, generating creative ideas
not necessarily associates with selecting good ideas; selection perfor-
mance rarely exceeds chance level (Faure, 2004; Rietzschel,
Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2014). Finally, situational factors that influence idea
generation may have a different impact on idea selection (Rietzschel
et al., 2014; Ritter, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2012). With these points
in mind, the first goal of the present study is to examine when and why
imminent threats influence the selection of creative threat responding.
In real life, however, people under imminent threat have to think of,
and decide on, a single fitting response themselves. Therefore, our
second goal here was to uncover when imminent threats associate with
self-generated creative threat-responding.
1. Motivated creativity under imminent threats
When coping with problematic situations, useful responses are ob-
viously required (Amabile, 1996; Humphries & Driver, 1967, 1970;
Runco & Jaeger, 2012). However, individuals may benefit most from
useful responses that are also original (i.e. creative responses). These
responses may provide new ways to solve problems and avoid and
confront threatening circumstances (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991), for in-
stance, to settle conflicts (De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008), avert the potential
loss of monetary resources (Roskes et al., 2012), and escape hostile
interpersonal encounters (Cheng, Baas, & De Dreu, 2016; Coccia, 2015).
In response to threatening circumstances, people may favor use-
fulness over originality because they hold a bias against originality
under such uncertain circumstances (Mueller et al., 2012). Likewise,
earlier work indicates that compared to common and practical ideas,
novel ideas are usually not preferred and selected for future im-
plementation, because people actively avoid potential risk (Mumford,
Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006). Accordingly, we predict that
threatened people tend to select useful rather than original responses
(Hypothesis 1).
However, as argued before, people benefit most from the selection
of responses that are both useful and original when dealing with
threatening circumstances. According to the motivated focus account of
creativity (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), threats increase people's motiva-
tion to cope with the threatening situation. This heightened motivation
drives people to mobilize cognitive resources to attend to and process
threat-relevant information (Elliot, 2008; Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck,
2009) and search for the most effective way to solve the problem at
hand. Accordingly, threats may improve people's creativity when their
creativity helps them to deal with the threat at hand (De Dreu &Nijstad,
2008). For example, people may come up with creative ways to deceive
opponents during conflictive negotiations (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008).
Because novel responses provide additional adaptive value in effective
threat-regulation (cf. Humphries & Driver, 1967, 1970), people may
appraise responses that are both original and useful as being particu-
larly effective to deal with threatening circumstances and will thus be
more likely to select creative responses for ultimate implementation.
If, as we propose, the degree of motivation steers the selection of
creative threat responses, we would expect that creative threat-re-
sponding will be influenced by two threat features: whether the threat
is directed towards the observer and the available time to think and
process the available options. The direction of threat signals whether
the observer is the target of the threat and modulates their evaluation of
the situation. Previous work shows that compared to threats (e.g.,
snakes, guns, angry faces) directed away from the observer, those di-
rected towards people themselves are perceived as more imminent and
self-relevant (Flykt, Esteves, & Öhman, 2007; Kveraga et al., 2015), and
thus elicit a stronger motivation to deal with the threat at hand. Ac-
cordingly, we predict that compared to people facing other-directed
threats, those facing self-directed threats may appraise responses that
are both original and useful as being particularly effective to deal with
threatening circumstances (Hypothesis 2) and will thus be more likely
to select and think of creative responses for ultimate implementation
(Hypothesis 3).
Another key feature of the threatening situation is the available time to
select a response. With valuable outcomes at stake (e.g., one's life, pos-
sessions), the need to respond immediately may result in considerably
experienced time pressure. Time pressure taxes cognitive resources and
interferes with extensive processing that would otherwise facilitate the
execution of the task (Andrews& Smith, 1996; Baumeister &Heatherton,
1996; De Dreu, 2003; Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, &De Dreu, 2013). Thus,
when it comes to the identification of useful yet original threat-responses,
time pressure may interfere with the assessment of the quality of threat-
responses and actual decision-making. Meanwhile, immediate responses
are often habitual and highly accessible; people need some time to arrive
at more original responses (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Finke, Ward, & Smith,
1992; Lucas &Nordgren, 2015). Given that time pressure interferes with
effortful thinking and achieving creativity often takes time, we expect a
detrimental effect of time pressure on creative response selection and
generation (Hypothesis 4).
Finally, dealing with time pressure consumes cognitive resources
that would otherwise be available for the execution of the task
(Karau & Kelly, 1992) and performance under the avoidance motivation
that is typically triggered in threatening circumstances relies heavily on
the recruitment and availability of cognitive resources and control
(Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Roskes et al., 2012; Ståhl,
Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2012). Indeed, when people experience relatively
stronger avoidance motivation, people's creative performance is en-
hanced only when time pressure is low rather than high (Nijstad, De
Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010; Roskes et al., 2013). Accordingly, we
predicted an interaction effect between time pressure and threat di-
rection on creative response selection and generation, such that when
threats are self-directed (i.e. avoidance motivation is particularly
strong), participants with more response time (i.e. low time pressure)
will generate and, perhaps, select, more creative responses than those
with little response time (i.e. high time pressure), but with weaker ef-
fects of time pressure when threats are other-directed (Hypothesis 5).
2. Present study
Three studies were conducted to test whether and why threat di-
rection and time pressure influence the selection and generation of
creative responses under imminent threat. To test our predictions re-
garding response selection, we developed a binary choice task in which
participants faced self-directed or other-directed threats and were asked
to choose one out of two alternative threat responses that differed on
either originality (low vs. high) or usefulness (low vs. high) to deal with
the presented threat; participants made their choices under either high
or low time pressure (Studies 1 and 2). To test our predictions, we
measured the preference for creative responses (responses high on both
originality and usefulness). To tease apart the trade-off between use-
fulness and originality during selection, we additionally measured the
preference for high-original and high-useful responses separately. In
Study 2, participants additionally indicated their perceived originality,
feasibility, and effectiveness of the alternative threat responses after the
binary choice task. In real life, however, people under imminent threat
have to think of, and decide on, a single fitting response themselves.
Therefore, our second goal here was to uncover when imminent threats
associate with self-generated creative threat-responding. Therefore, in
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Study 3, participants facing self-directed or other-directed threats were
asked to think of, and decide on, a fitting response under low or high
time pressure. We report all measures, manipulations, exclusions, and
the method of determining the sample size in the two studies.
3. Study 1
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Design and participants
One hundred and thirty-four participants (68% female,
Mage = 22.37, SD= 3.16) participated for payment (€5) or course
credit. The sample size was determined a priori using G*Power software
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on earlier work on idea
generation (Cheng et al., 2016), we calculated that to obtain a small to
medium effect (ŋp2 = .02) with a mixed design would require at least
one hundred participants (at power = .80, α = .05). We recruited
slightly more in the consideration of potential exclusion of participants.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (time
pressure: high vs. low; both n = 67) × 2 (threat direction: self-directed
vs. other-directed) design with the latter factor within-subjects.
Dependent variables were manipulation checks and preference for
creative, original, and useful threat responses. The study had ethics
approval, participants signed informed consent forms, and received a
debriefing upon completion of the experiment.
3.1.2. Procedure and manipulation
Participants were tested individually in cubicles equipped with a
computer that displayed all instructions and registered all responses.
Participants first provided demographic information, such as age and
gender. Subsequently, they started a binary choice task with 64 trials.
Participants were instructed that in each trial, they would see a picture
depicting a threatening situation along with two possible responses to
deal with the depicted threat. Out of the two alternative responses, they
were asked to select the response that they would use when facing the
depicted situation. There were eight different pictures depicting a
human attack with weapons (guns, knives, glasses, or sticks2). Four of
these threat pictures depicted attacks directed at the participants (self-
directed threat), and the other four depicted attacks not directed at the
participants (other-directed threats) (see supplementary materials).
Pilot tests have shown that self-directed and other-directed threats are
equivalent in the level of threat, but self-directed threats are more
arousing, personally relevant, and more strongly directed at the parti-
cipant than other-directed threats.
In addition, there were eight response pairs with alternative re-
sponses that differed in the level of originality and usefulness. Pairs of
responses were selected on the basis of a pretest in a different sample
(N = 91). Pretest participants rated how original and useful forty-two
different responses were to deal with a specific threat on 7-point scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Threats were presented in
pictures that either depicted self-directed attacks or other-directed at-
tacks (the same pictures as in the main study). On the basis of pretest
findings, we selected eight pairs of response choices that were always
different on one dimension (i.e. within a response pair, one response
was low and the other was high on either originality or usefulness) and
equivalent on the other dimension (i.e. within a response pair both
responses were either low or high on either originality or usefulness).
For example, a response pair with the responses “convince the attacker
is attacking the wrong person” and “lay still on the floor” contains re-
sponses that are both high on usefulness, but the first one is high and
the second one is low on originality. A response pair with the responses
“distract the other's attention” and “spit at the attacker” contains re-
sponses that are both high on originality, but the first one is high and
the second one is low on usefulness. This resulted in eight different
response pairs (see Table 1). In total, the binary choice task consisted of
64 trials (crossing eight different pictures with eight different response
pairs).
Participants in the main study completed the binary choice task
with blocks consisting of only self-directed or other-directed threats
with the order of blocks counterbalanced. The two alternatives of each
response pair were either positioned left or right, with position counter-
balanced across trials. We manipulated time pressure: For each trial,
half of the participants were asked to make their decision within 7 s
(high time pressure); the other half first had a “thinking period” of 10 s
during which they saw the threatening picture along with a pair of
alternative responses, after which they had 7 s to make their choice
(low time pressure). In both conditions, the time available for making a
choice was indicated by a timer. If participants did not make their
choice within the allotted time, we recorded a miss for this trial.
Following the binary choice task, participants completed manipulation
checks.
Table 1
Response pairs that allowed for originality (upper panel) and usefulness comparisons (lower panel).
Originality comparison
Low usefulness & low originality Low usefulness & high
originality
Pair 1 Fight Seduce the attacker
Pair 2 Make yourself big Display erratic behavior
High usefulness & high originality High usefulness & low
originality
Pair 3 Convince the attacker is attacking the
wrong person
Lay still on the floor
Pair 4 Show understanding Talk to the attacker
Usefulness comparison
Low usefulness & low originality High usefulness & low
originality
Pair 5 Think about a solution Stay vigilant
Pair 6 Intimidate Find a weapon to defend
yourself
High usefulness & high originality Low usefulness & high
originality
Pair 7 Distract the attacker's attention Spit at the attacker
Pair 8 Apply psychological interview
techniques
Disguise yourself
2 The stimulus pictures were selected from an image set created by Kveraga et al., 2015
(for details K. Kveraga, http://martinos.org/~kestas/affcon), and have been pilot-tested
and used in previous studies. Results of the pilot study revealed a significant effect of
threat direction on personal relevance ratings, t(52) = 4.32, p < .001, with stronger
personal relevance reported in the self-directed (M = 4.38, SD = 1.72) rather than other-
directed threat condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.68).
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3.1.3. Dependent variables
We assessed participants' perceived time pressure by asking parti-
cipants to what extent they experienced time pressure and to what
extent they felt they had plenty of time to make their choices (reverse
scored) on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale
(Cronbach's α = .68). From the choices participants made, we ex-
tracted three variables: preference for originality, preference for use-
fulness, and preference for creative responses. Preference for originality
was calculated as the percentage of high-original responses chosen from
the completed response pairs that contained a high- and low-original
response (and were thus equivalent on usefulness). Not every partici-
pant made their choice within the allotted limit, with the percentage of
missed choices varying from 0% to 8% in high time pressure condition,
and from 0% to 3% in low time pressure condition. Therefore, for each
participant, we always divided the number of selected high-original
responses by the number of completed decisions for high- vs. low-ori-
ginality response pairs.
A similar procedure was used to compute participants' preference
for usefulness: we divided the number of selected high-useful responses
by the number of completed decisions for high- vs. low-usefulness re-
sponse pairs. Finally, we extracted the variable preference for creative
responses, namely, the preference for threat responses that score high
on both originality and usefulness. Out of eight possible response pairs,
four contained responses that were both high in originality and use-
fulness (see Table 1). To get an index of preference for creativity, we
divided the number of selected creative responses by the number of
completed decisions for high- vs. low-quality response pairs.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Manipulation check
A t-test confirmed that our manipulation of time pressure was suc-
cessful. Participants reported more time pressure in the high
(M = 3.96, SD = 1.67) than in the low time pressure condition
(M= 2.11, SD = 1.16), t(132) = 7.40, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.29.
3.2.2. Preference for creativity
The descriptive statistics of each condition are reported in Table 2.
First, to test the effect of time pressure and threat direction on pre-
ference for creative responses (i.e. responses that are both original and
useful), we submitted the preference for creativity to a 2 (time pressure:
high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs. other-directed
threat) repeated measure ANOVA with the latter factor within-subjects.
We found a significant main effect of threat direction, F(1, 132) = 8.34,
p = .005, ŋp2 = .06. Participants facing self-directed threats selected
creative responses (M= .68, SD = .16) more frequently than those
facing other-directed threats (M = .65, SD = .15; see Fig. 1). The main
effect of time pressure, F(1, 132) = 0.05, p = .830, ŋp2 = .00, and the
interaction effect between time pressure and threat direction, F(1, 132)
= .12, p= .733, ŋp2 = .00, were not significant.
3.2.3. Preference for originality and usefulness
To further tease apart the effects on originality and usefulness di-
mensions, we submitted the preference for originality and preference
for usefulness to a 2 (time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of
threat: self-directed vs. other-directed threat) × 2 (type of responses:
originality vs. usefulness) repeated measure ANOVA with the latter two
factors within-subjects. The results showed a significant main effect of
type of responses, F(1, 132) = 95.46, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.42. Overall,
the preference for high-useful responses (M= .73, SD = .13) was
stronger than the preference for high-original responses (M = .53,
SD = .16). Thus, supporting Hypothesis 1, usefulness weighs more
heavily than originality, also when dealing with assaults from other
humans.
In addition, there was a significant main effect of threat direction, F
(1, 132) = 14.87, p < .001, ŋp2 = .10, but no significant interaction
between threat direction and type of responses, F(1, 132) = 2.21,
p = .139, ŋp2 = .02. Still, looking into the effect of threat direction on
the preference for originality and usefulness separately, we found a
significant main effect of threat direction on the preference for origin-
ality, F(1, 132) = 10.51, p= .002, ŋp2 = .07, with the high-original
responses being selected more frequently under self-directed threats
(M= .56, SD= .18) than under other-directed threats (M = .51,
SD = .18) (see Fig. 1). The same pattern was found for preference for
usefulness, F(1, 132) = 4.67, p = .033, ŋp2 = .03, with a slightly
stronger preference for useful responses under self-directed threats
(M= .74, SD= .15) than under other-directed threats (M = .72,
SD = .14) (see Fig. 1). The main effect of time pressure (F(1, 132)
= .04, p= .845, ŋp2 = .00), and the interaction between time pressure
and threat direction (F(1, 132) = .27, p= .606, ŋp2 = .00), as well as
the interaction between time pressure and type of responses (F(1, 132)
= 0.36, p= .552, ŋp2 = .00) were not significant.
Finally, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 132) = 6.90,
p = .010, ŋp2 = .05. Post-hoc contrasts of the three-way interaction
revealed that when time pressure was high, there was a significant
Table 2
Preference for creative, original, and useful responses for each condition.
Preference Condition
Self-directed threats Other-directed threats
Low time pressure High time pressure Low time pressure High time pressure
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Creativity 0.68 0.14 0.68 0.17 0.65 0.13 0.64 0.17
Originality 0.54 0.18 0.58 0.17 0.52 0.18 0.51 0.17
Usefulness 0.75 0.15 0.72 0.16 0.71 0.13 0.72 0.14
Note. Threat direction was manipulated within-subjects.







self-directed threats other-directed threats
Fig. 1. Preference for creative, original, and usefulness threat-responses as a function of
threat direction (Study 1, reported in percentage, M ± SE).
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effect of threat direction on the preference for originality, F(1, 132)
= 13.14, p < .001, ŋp2 = .09, with more high-original responses
being selected when exposed to self-directed rather than other-directed
threats, but no difference on the preference for originality was found
when time pressure was low, F(1, 190) = .92, p = .339. However, the
pattern for the preference for usefulness was opposite: when time
pressure was low, there was a significant effect of threat direction on
the preference for usefulness, F(1, 132) = 8.05, p = .005, ŋp2 = .06,
with more high-useful responses being selected when being exposed to
self-directed rather than other-directed threats, but no difference was
found when time pressure was high, F(1, 132) = 0.05, p = .828,
ŋp2 = .00.
3.3. Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 shows that when dealing with a threat, people are generally
more likely to select useful than original threat responses. This fits
earlier work showing that people have a strong tendency to favor fea-
sible and useful rather than original ideas (Rietzschel,
Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2010). Moreover, whereas time pressure did not
influence the selection of threat responses, threat direction did: self-
directed threats led to a stronger preference for creative threat re-
sponses, as well as for high-original and high-useful threat responses
than other-directed threats. This fits the motivated focus account that
people favor creative responses more when threats are imminent and
personally relevant, and thus more motivating.
4. Study 2
Study 2 was designed to replicate Study 1's findings with the same
manipulations and binary choice task but with threat direction as a
between-subjects factor. We tested for time pressure again, to verify
whether the null findings involving time pressure in Study 1 were ro-
bust rather than false negatives. More importantly, we extended Study
1 by testing whether perceived effectiveness of threat responses med-
iates the relation between threat direction and response selection. If the
pattern observed in Study 1 was indeed due to increased motivation to
protect against the threat, threatened people should select the response
perceived to be most effective to solve the problem at hand. Given that
novel responses serve as an adaptive device against imminent attack
(Humphries & Driver, 1970), we proposed that self-directed threats
would lead to a stronger preference for creative responses because
people under self-directed threats should perceive creative ideas as
being more effective than those under other-directed threats. To in-
vestigate this possibility, we asked participants, after the binary choice
task, to indicate how effective, original, and feasible each alternative
threat response was in dealing with the presented threats.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Design and participants
Participants (N = 239, 74.5% female, Mage = 22.36, SD= 4.96)
were randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (time pressure: low vs.
high) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs. other-directed) be-
tween-subjects design. Based on the results in Study 1, we expected a
medium effect size (ŋp2 = .07). Power analysis with G*Power showed
the minimum sample size should be 225 with a between-subjects design
(at power = .80, α= .05). Dependent variables were manipulation
checks, preference for originality, usefulness, and creativity, and per-
ceived originality, feasibility, and effectiveness of the alternative threat
responses.
4.1.2. Procedure, manipulation and dependent variables
The procedure, materials, and manipulations were the same as in
Study 1, with the following exceptions. First, threat direction was ma-
nipulated between-subjects. Second, we added two pictures displaying
human attacks with a gun that, depending on condition, were either
self-directed or other-directed,3 so there were six threat pictures in each
threat-direction condition (three displaying a human attack with guns,
the other three displaying human attacks with the close distance
weapons knife, stick, and glass). Third, following manipulation checks,
participants rated all the 16 alternative responses from the binary
choice task. Participants were presented with the same threatening
pictures that were presented in the binary choice task (the pictures
displayed either self-directed or other-directed threats depending on
condition), and rated all alternative responses, one by one, on how
original (Cronbach's α = .90), effective (Cronbach's α= .91), and
feasible (Cronbach's α= .80) they were in dealing with the presented
threatening situations on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much). Originality is the degree to which an idea is
unique, unusual, unexpected, or atypical. The usefulness of a response
is determined by the effectiveness and feasibility of the response. Ef-
fectiveness is the degree to which an idea is helpful to avert the threat.
Feasibility focuses on ease of application and is the degree to which an
idea is practical or doable, considering any aspects of reality (e.g., room
for escape). The order of the 16 responses was randomized. To support
the distinction between originality, effectiveness, and feasibility, con-
firmatory factor analyses showed better fit for a three-factor model than
for a two-factor model (originality vs. effectiveness and feasibility), and
one-factor model (all Δχ2 > 67.20, ps < .001).
The preference for originality, usefulness, and creativity was com-
puted as in Study 1. Additionally, from the response pairs that con-
tained a high- and low-original response, we computed the average
originality, feasibility, and effectiveness ratings of the high and low-
original responses separately. From the response pairs that contained a
high- and low-useful response, we calculated the average originality,




To verify the effectiveness of our manipulation of time pressure, we
conducted a 2 (time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat:
self-directed vs. other-directed threat) between-subjects factorial
ANOVA with perceived time pressure as dependent variable, and found
a main effect of time pressure, F(1, 235) = 127.34, p < .001,
ŋp2 = .35. Participants in the high time pressure condition experienced
more time pressure (M= 3.87, SD = 1.29) than those in the low time
pressure condition (M= 1.97, SD = 1.31). No other effects were found,
Fs < 1.29, ps > .25.
We then submitted the originality ratings of high- and low-original
responses to a paired sample t-test to verify that the originality of pre-
selected high-original responses was, in fact, higher than that of the pre-
selected low-original responses. The results showed the high-original
responses were indeed perceived as more original (M = 5.07,
SD = 0.99) than the low-original responses (M = 3.41, SD= 1.01), t
(238) = 22.44, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.66. Likewise, paired sample t-
tests comparing feasibility and effectiveness ratings of preselected high
and low-useful responses showed that high-useful responses were per-
ceived as more feasible (M = 4.54, SD = .85) and effective (M = 4.66,
SD = .78) than low-useful responses (Mfeasible = 4.11, SD = 0.94, t
(238) = 8.52, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = .49;Meffective = 3.13, SD = .73,
t(238) = 26.61, p < .001, Cohen's d = 2.02).
3 The added stimulus pictures were selected from the image set used in Study 1
(Kveraga et al., 2015). These pictures together with those ones used in Study 1, have been
pilot-tested and used in previous studies. Results of the pilot study showed a significant
effect of threat direction on personal relevance ratings, t(52) = 5.33, p < .001, with
stronger personal relevance reported in the self-directed (M = 4.54, SD = 1.65) rather
than other-directed threat condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.61).
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4.2.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows means and standard deviations, along with zero-
order correlations for all variables included in Study 2. Preference for
originality associated negatively with preference for usefulness. Fur-
thermore, preference for creative threat responses associated positively
with preference for originality and preference for usefulness, but the
association with preference for originality was stronger (r = .51,
p < .001) than the association with preference for usefulness (r = .13,
p = .048). In addition, preference for creative threat responses was
more strongly associated with effectiveness ratings of high-original
responses (r= .34, p < .001) than with effectiveness ratings of high-
useful responses (r = .16, p= .015). Finally, effectiveness ratings of
high-original responses associated positively with preference for ori-
ginality.
4.2.3. Preference for creativity
The descriptive statistics for each condition are reported in Table 4.
To test the effect of time pressure and threat direction on preference for
creative responses, we submitted the preference for creativity to a 2
(time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs.
other-directed threat) between-subjects factorial ANOVA. Consistent
with the results in Study 1, we found a significant main effect of threat
direction, F(1, 235) = 12.38, p= .001, ŋp2 = .05. Participants facing
self-directed threats selected the creative responses (M= .70,
SD = .15) more frequently than those facing other-directed threats
(M = .63, SD = .12). The main effect of time pressure, F(1, 235)
= 1.02, p= .314, ŋp2 = .00, and the interaction effect between time
pressure and threat direction, F(1, 235) = .21, p = .646, ŋp2 = .00,
were not significant.
4.2.4. Preference for originality and usefulness
We then submitted the preference for originality and usefulness to a
2 (time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs.
other-directed threat) × 2 (type of responses: originality vs. usefulness)
repeated measure ANOVA with the last variable within-subjects.
Similar to Study 1's findings, the analysis revealed a significant main
effect of type of responses, F(1, 235) = 285.53, p < .001, ŋp2 = .55,
with the overall preference for usefulness (M = .76, SD = .13) being
higher than the overall preference for originality (M= .48, SD = .20).
The main effect of threat direction was not significant, F(1, 235)
= .72, p = .396, ŋp2 = .00. We then looked into its effect on preference
for originality and usefulness separately and found that the main effect
of threat direction on preference for originality was not significant, F(1,
235) = 1.78, p = .184, ŋp2 = .01, although means were in the ex-
pected direction; the effect of threat direction on preference for use-
fulness was not significant, F(1, 235) = .37, p= .542, ŋp2 = .00.
The main effect of time pressure was significant, F(1, 235) = 3.99,
p = .047, ŋp2 = .02, with, in general, stronger preference for high-
original and high-useful responses under high time-pressure. However,
when looking into its effect on the preference for originality and use-
fulness separately, the effect of time pressure was not significant for
either the preference for originality (F(1, 235) = 2.31, p = .130,
ŋp2 = .01) or for usefulness (F(1, 235) = .93, p= .337, ŋp2 = .00).
There was no significant interaction between threat direction and
time pressure, F(1, 235) = .46, p = .498, ŋp2 = .00, between threat
direction and type of responses, F(1, 235) = 1.76, p = .185, ŋp2 = .01,
or between time pressure and type of responses: F(1, 235) = .44,
p = .507, ŋp2 = .00. In addition, and inconsistent with the findings of
Study 1, the three-way interaction was not significant either, F(1, 235)
= .01, p= .908, ŋp2 = .00.
4.2.5. Mediation analyses: effectiveness ratings as potential mediators
To test our hypothesis that compared to other-directed threats, self-
directed threats would increase people's preference for creative threat
responses because they are seen as more effective in dealing with the
threat at hand, we ran a “multiple mediator model” to test whether
threat direction influences preference for creative responses through its
influence on effectiveness ratings of either the high-original or high-
useful responses, or perhaps both. We bootstrapped the indirect effects
of threat direction on preference for creative responses through both
potential mediators (Nboot = 5000). As expected, threat direction in-
fluenced preference for creative responses indirectly through its effect
on effectiveness ratings of high-original responses (unstandardized in-
direct effect= .02, SEboot = .01, 95% CI = .007, .032). As can be seen
in Fig. 2A, participants in the self-directed threat condition rated high-
original responses as being more effective to deal with the threat at
hand than those in the other-directed threat condition (B = .37,
SE = .12, p = .001), and the higher effectiveness ratings of the high-
original responses led to an increased preference for creative responses
(B= .05, SE = .01, p < .001). However, there was no evidence that
threat direction affected preference for creativity through its effect on
effectiveness ratings of high-useful responses (unstandardized indirect
effect= .002, SEboot = .003, 95% CI = −.001, .011).
Moreover, although we did not find a significant main effect of
Table 3
Means, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 2, N = 239).
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Preference for originality .48 .20
2 Preference for usefulness .76 .13 −.20⁎⁎
3 Preference for creativity .67 .14 .51⁎⁎⁎ .13⁎
4 Originality ratings of high-original responses 5.07 .99 .10 −.01 .08
5 Originality ratings of high-useful responses 3.90 .98 .10 −.04 .01 .10
6 Feasibility ratings of high-original responses 4.28 1.00 .02 −.01 .05 −.01 .01
7 Feasibility ratings of high-useful responses 4.54 .85 −.09 .02 −.003 −.05 −.05 .61⁎⁎⁎
8 Effectiveness ratings of high-original responses 3.72 .91 .36⁎⁎⁎ −.04 .34⁎⁎⁎ .02 .04 .01 .04
9 Effectiveness ratings of high-useful responses 4.66 .78 −.02 .04 .16⁎ .11 −.04 .31⁎⁎⁎ .50⁎⁎⁎ .15⁎
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
Table 4
Preference for creative, original, and useful responses for each condition (Study 2).
Preference Condition









M SD M SD M SD M SD
Creativity .69 .16 .70 .14 .62 .12 .65 .12
Originality .48 .20 .51 .23 .44 .15 .49 .20
Usefulness .75 .12 .76 .13 .75 .14 .78 .13
Note. Threat direction was manipulated between-subjects.
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threat direction on preference for high-original responses in this study,
contemporary approaches to mediation analysis suggest that lack of
such a significant direct effect does not preclude testing for indirect
effects (Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 2016; Hayes, 2009; Rucker,
Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Therefore, we explored the possi-
bility that threat direction (self-directed threat = 1, other-directed
threat = 0) exerts an effect on preference for originality indirectly
through the effectiveness ratings of high-original responses by using a
bootstrapping procedure (Preacher &Hayes, 2008). The results showed
that threat direction indeed influenced preference for originality in-
directly through its effect on effectiveness ratings of high-original re-
sponses. As can be seen in Fig. 2B, participants in the self-directed
threat condition perceived the high-original responses as being more
effective in dealing with the presented threats than those in the other-
directed threat condition (B= .37, SE = .12, p= .001), and effec-
tiveness ratings of high-original responses positively predicted the
preference for high-original threat responses (B= .08, SE = .01,
p < .001). The indirect effect was significant based on 5000 bootstrap
samples (unstandardized indirect effect= .03, SEboot = .01, 95%
CI = .012, .053).
5. Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 both show that people under imminent threats have
a preference for useful rather than original responses, while self-di-
rected threats, compared to other-directed threats, led to a stronger
preference for original (albeit indirectly) and creative responses, be-
cause original responses were perceived as more effective. However, in
real-life situations, people under imminent threats have to think of and
decide on an appropriate response themselves, rather than select from a
list of pre-generated responses. Moreover, when facing imminent
threats, people have to come up with a proper response quickly and the
generation and selection of an appropriate response are high in tem-
poral proximity and likely coincide. Therefore, to further raise the
ecological validity of our findings, the goal of Study 3 was to examine
the effect of imminent threat on creative threat-responding in a more
realistic design in which participants had to think of, and decide on, a
single response to each presented imminent threat. Based on the mo-
tivated focus account, we predicted more creative threat responses in
people facing self-directed rather than other-directed threats. We ad-
ditionally tested the effect of time pressure. Time pressure may not have
an effect on the selection of pre-generated responses (see Studies 1 and
2), but could have an effect when people have to generate and decide
on a response themselves as this situation may require more effortful
information processing. Given that time pressure interferes with ef-
fortful thinking and achieving creativity often takes time (Braunstein-
bercovitz, 2003; Finke et al., 1992; Nijstad et al., 2010), we examined
whether there was a main effect of time pressure with lower creativity
in people under high as compared to low time pressure. Moreover, al-
though the interaction effects between time pressure and threat direc-
tion were not significant in the first two studies, we examined whether
a possible interaction effect does occur with the new experimental
paradigm in an exploratory fashion.
The new experimental design also enabled us to examine the type of
tactics participants came up with. Adaptive threat-responding ulti-
mately requires the preparation and execution of calibrated behaviors
that meet situational demands and available resources
(Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). The specific defensive behavior chosen
depends on the features of the threat, such as the intensity, ambiguity,
and the direction of the threat, as well as the context of the threat, such
as the (in)escapability of the situation and the distance between the
threat and the threatened subject (D. C. Blanchard, Hynd, Minke,
Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001; Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). For in-
stance, defenders' responses vary systematically as threat imminence
increases, changing from risk assessment and preparing for defensive
actions when the threat is potentially, but not detectably, present,
through freezing when the threat is detected but not attacking, to active
defense actions, such as fight and flight, when confrontation is in-
evitable (Blanchard et al., 2001; Fanselow, 1994; Mobbs, Hagan,
Dalgleish, Silston, & Prévost, 2015).
One feature that influences the perception of threat imminence, and
that may thus modulate the type of defensive responses that people
A
B
Fig. 2. Parallel multiple mediators model for preference for
creative responses (Panel A) and simple mediation model
for preference for original responses (Panel B) in Study 2
(displayed are unstandardized coefficients for each path).
Effectiveness ratings of high-original responses rather than
effectiveness ratings of high-useful responses mediated of
the link between threat direction and preference for crea-
tive responses. Moreover, threat direction affected pre-
ference for originality indirectly through effectiveness rat-
ings of high-original responses. aSelf-directed threats = 1,
other-directed threats = 0. ⁎p < .05, ⁎⁎p < .01,
⁎⁎⁎p < .001.
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come up with, is the direction of threat – whether the threat is directed
towards, or away from, the observer. To explore this possibility, the
tactics generated by participants were coded into eight broad defense
categories: flight tactics (e.g., “run away”, “walk backwards”), fight
tactics (e.g., “strike back”, “find weapons”), freeze tactics (e.g., “stand
still”, “make no sound”), risk assessment tactics (e.g., “be vigilant”,
“check out the situation”), cooperative approach tactics (e.g., “convince
the attacker that it is meaningless to hurt you”, “act friendly”), non-
functional avoidance tactics (e.g., “ignore the threat”, “act as if nothing
is wrong”), help-seeking behaviors (e.g., “call for help”, “seek protec-
tion in a group”) and unspecified tactics that contained ideas that could
not be coded into the former seven (e.g., “take precautions”, “stay
calm”). These eight categories were derived from Blanchard's (1997)
work and the results of a pre-test. Several changes were made to
Blanchard's original list of five defensive behaviors that were derived
from the animal literature, mostly to accommodate uniquely human
responses. First, we put defensive threat and defensive attack together
under the category “fight” because they both represent approach-or-
iented active defense tactics that are usually displayed when threats are
imminent. Second, we separated non-functional avoidance from freeze
tactics, because non-functional avoidance includes deliberately denying
the existence of the threat, which is different from freezing – the ab-
sence of all overt behaviors induced by overwhelming threats
(Bolles & Collier, 1976). Third, we added a help-seeking category be-
cause in threatening circumstances, it may be highly adaptive to seek
protection from relevant others (Griskevicius et al., 2006), including
members of the in-group or the police. Fourth, because humans have
highly developed language skills and a strong ability for perspective
taking, cooperative approach was included as a separate category. From
the generated ideas, we could extract the number of ideas within the
aforementioned eight defense categories.
A
B
Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of a trial in the creative defense response task in the high time-pressure condition (Panel A) and low time-pressure condition (Panel B). In the high time-
pressure condition, a trial started with the presentation of a picture depicting either self-directed threats or other-directed threats. Participants were asked to think about one response to
the depicted situation and press “Enter” when they figured out their solution. Hereafter, they typed in their response in the given box and pressed “Enter” when they finished typing. The
trial ended after the response was registered or 12 s had elapsed since the onset of the trial. In the low time-pressure condition, participants first saw the picture and question for 10 s in
which they could not enter their response. After that, the trial was identical to the one in the high time-pressure condition.
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5.1. Method
5.1.1. Design and participants
On the basis of earlier work (Cheng et al., 2016; Roskes et al., 2012)
and the findings of the first two studies, we expected to obtain small to
medium effect sizes. Using the G*Power software (Faul et al., 2007), we
calculated that to obtain a small to medium effect (ŋp2 = .025) would
require 309 participants (at power = .80, α= .05). We recruited 328
participants (73% female, Mage = 21.97, SD = 3.01) in two waves of
data collection. Participants received €5 or course credit and were
randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (time pressure: low vs.
high) × 2 (threat direction: self-directed vs. other-directed) between-
subjects design. Dependent variables were manipulation checks, the
mean originality and usefulness of the threat-responses, the number of
creative threat-responses participants generated, and the type of re-
sponses that participants generated. The study had ethics approval, and
participants signed informed consent and were debriefed upon com-
pletion of the study. We report all measures, manipulations, and ex-
clusions in the study.
5.1.2. Procedure and manipulation
After participants were seated in individual cubicles equipped with
a computer that displayed all instructions and registered all responses.
Participants were instructed that they would see a series of pictures
depicting threatening situations and for each situation, they were asked
to think about and type in what they would do when they would be
confronted with the threatening situation shown in the picture (see
Fig. 3). Depending on threat-direction condition, pictures depicted
threats directed at the viewer (self-directed threat), or threats not di-
rected at the viewer (other-directed threat; see Studies 1 and 2). In
total, participants completed 7 trials,4 with each trial containing a
different picture and with pictures presented in random order.
In addition to manipulating the direction of the threat, we ma-
nipulated time pressure. To enable participants to key in their threat
response, they were allotted more time than in Studies 1 and 2 where
participants only had to select their response with a mouse click. Thus,
half of the participants were asked to think about, decide, and enter
their response within 12 s (high time pressure); the other half were also
asked to generate and enter their response, but first had a “thinking
period” of 10 s during which they could not type in their answer; fol-
lowing this 10s period they had another 12 s to enter their response
(low time pressure). In both conditions, the time available for gen-
erating and typing was indicated by a timer. Following this task, par-
ticipants answered some questions about perceived time pressure and
their feelings regarding the pictures.
5.1.3. Dependent variables
We assessed the extent to which participants perceived the pictures
as threatening (“I found the pictures threatening”, “I found the pictures
negative”, and “I found the pictures unpleasant”, Cronbach's α = .77)
and arousing (“I felt vigilant while looking at the pictures”, and “I felt
alert while looking at the pictures”, Cronbach's α = .86), and on two
single items whether the situations depicted in the pictures were per-
sonally relevant and directed at participants on a 7-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree). In addition, participants
indicated whether they experienced time pressure and whether they
had plenty of time to come up with a response (reverse scored) on a 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale (Cronbach's α = .73).
From the threat-responses participants entered, we calculated the
mean originality and usefulness of ideas and the number of creative
ideas. To obtain a measure of originality, one trained and independent
coder scored each idea for the extent to which it was novel and
uncommon on a 5-point scale (1 = not original at all, 5 = very original).
To obtain a measure of usefulness, one trained and independent coder
scored each idea for the extent to which it was feasible and effective on
a 5-point scale (1 = not useful at all, 5 = very useful). To facilitate
comparability between studies, ratings were based on the originality
and usefulness ratings of the preselected responses of the pre-test (see
Study 1). However, many of the alternative responses in Study 3 were
not among the preselected responses of the pre-test. These responses
received new originality and usefulness ratings. In addition, many
originality and especially usefulness ratings depended on the threa-
tening situation depicted in the picture. For instance, running away
when facing an aggressor with a knife is more useful than running away
from an aggressor with a gun, and even more useful if the threatened
person is not the focal point of interest of the aggressor (i.e. in the
other-directed threat condition). Therefore, the originality and espe-
cially usefulness ratings were based of the specific threatening situation
depicted in the picture. A second rater coded a subset of 120 threat
responses. Interrater reliability for originality (ICC = .81, p < .001)
and usefulness (ICC = .84, p < .001) was good. We averaged origin-
ality and usefulness ratings across all ideas an individual generated to
correct for differences in fluency. To obtain a measure of creativity, we
counted the number of ideas that had a minimum rating of 3 on both
the originality and usefulness dimension.
We additionally content-coded each threat-response. The threat-
responses generated by participants were coded into eight broad de-
fense categories: flight tactics, fight tactics, freeze tactics, risk assess-
ment tactics, cooperative approach tactics, non-functional avoidance
tactics, help-seeking tactics, and unspecified tactics that contained ideas
that could not be coded into the former seven (see Introduction of Study
3). One trained and independent rater coded all tactics. A second rater
coded a subset of 120 tactics. Interrater reliability was excellent,




We submitted manipulation check indicators to separate 2 (time
pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs. other-
directed threat) ANOVAs. For the extent to which threats in the pictures
were perceived as being directed to themselves, we only found a main
effect of threat direction, F(1, 324) = 356.87, p < .001, ŋp2 = .52.
Participants in the self-directed threat condition reported the threats in
the pictures to be more directed to themselves (M = 5.94, SD = 1.26)
than those in the other-directed threat (M= 3.02, SD = 1.52).
Although threat direction did not influence the experience of threat, F
(1, 324) = 1.60, p= .206, ŋp2 = .01; threat direction did affect
arousal, F(1, 324) = 8.83, p = .003, ŋp2 = .03. Participants in the self-
directed threat condition felt more vigilant and alert (M = 5.20,
SD = 1.31) than those in the other-directed threat condition
(M= 4.76, SD= 1.39). We also obtained the main effect of threat di-
rection on personal relevance ratings, F(1, 324) = 5.55, p = .019,
ŋp2 = .02, with stronger personal relevance reported in the self-di-
rected (M = 3.80, SD= 1.82) than in the other-directed threat condi-
tion (M = 3.34, SD= 1.72). No effects involving time pressure were
found, Fs < 1, ps > .399. Thus, although the level of threat was the
same for both conditions, self-directed threats were perceived as more
self-directed, arousing, and personally relevant, than other-directed
threats.
When looking at perceived time pressure, the 2 (time pressure: high
vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs. other-directed threat)
ANOVA revealed that participants in the high time pressure condition
experienced more time pressure (M= 5.56, SD = 1.36) than those in
the low time pressure condition (M= 4.22, SD= 1.79), F(1, 324)
= 57.95, p < .001, ŋp2 = .15. No other effects were found, Fs < 1,
ps > 0.48. Accordingly, we conclude that direction of threat and time
4 For another research project, participants also completed 7 trials depicting aggressive
encounters with animals. Interested readers can obtain findings from the second author.
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pressure were manipulated as intended.
5.2.2. Creativity
To test our hypotheses, we submitted the number of creative re-
sponses to a 2 (time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat:
self-directed vs. other-directed threat) ANOVA. Whereas the main effect
of time pressure (F(1, 324) = 1.21, p = .273, ŋp2 = .00) and interac-
tion between time pressure and direction of threat were not significant
(F(1, 324) = 0.21, p= .651, ŋp2 = .00), there was a main effect of
threat direction, F(1324) = 16.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, with more
creative responses generated in the self-directed threat condition
(M = .43, SD = .84) than in the other-directed threat condition
(M = .14, SD = .40).
5.2.3. Originality and usefulness
We submitted the mean originality and usefulness of the responses
to a 2 (time pressure: high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-di-
rected vs. other-directed threat) × 2 (creativity dimension: originality
vs. usefulness) repeated measures ANOVA with the latter factor within-
subjects. First, there was a main effect of dimension, with generated
ideas being much more useful (M= 3.50, SD= .46) than original
(M = 1.52, SD = .37), F(1, 324) = 2459.54, p < .001, ŋp2 = .88.
Second, there were main effects of time pressure (F(1, 324) = 6.28,
p = .013, ŋp2 = .02) and threat direction (F(1, 324) = 3.91, p = .049,
ŋp2 = .01), with higher scores obtained in the low as compared to high
time pressure condition, and in the self-directed as compared to the
other-directed threat condition (see Table 5 and findings below).
Third, whereas the two- and three-way interaction effects involving
time pressure were not significant, F < 2.29, p > .130, ŋp2 < .01,
there was an interaction between creativity dimension and threat di-
rection, F(1, 324) = 52.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Two one-way
ANOVAs showed that the ideas generated in the self-directed threat
condition were more original (M= 1.68, SD = .38) and less useful
(M = 3.37, SD = .42) than those generated in the other-directed threat
condition (Moriginality = 1.36, SD= .29; Musefulness = 3.63, SD = .47),
Foriginality(1, 324) = 76.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .19; Fusefulness(1, 324)
= 26.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. The same ANOVA revealed that ideas
generated in the low time pressure condition (M= 1.57, SD = .40)
were more original than those in the high time pressure condition
(M = 1.47, SD = .34), F(1, 324) = 7.96, p = .005, ηp2 = .02. No other
significant effects were found, F < 1.06, p > .305, ŋp2 < .01.
5.2.4. Type of threat responses
To examine the effect of time pressure and threat direction on the
type of threat-responses people came up with, we submitted the number
of responses generated within each tactic type to a 2 (time pressure:
high vs. low) × 2 (direction of threat: self-directed vs. other-directed
threat) × 8 (defense category: flight, fight, freeze, risk assessment,
cooperative approach, non-functional avoidance, help-seeking, and
unspecified tactics) repeated measure ANOVA with the latter factor
within-subjects. We found a significant main effect of time pressure,
with more responses being generated in the low (M = 6.66, SD= .48)
as compared to the high time pressure condition (M = 6.54, SD = .86),
F(1, 324) = 8.77, p= .003, ŋp2 = .03. In addition, we found a sig-
nificant main effect of defense category, F(7, 318) = 1071.18,
p < .001, ŋp2 = .96. As can be seen in Table 5, contrasts comparing
the number of ideas for each tactic type to the number of ideas for the
preceding tactic type showed that individuals came up with more co-
operative approach tactics than flight tactics (p < .001), more flight
tactics than fight tactics (p < .001), more fight tactics than unspecified
tactics (p = .012), more unspecified tactics than freeze, help seeking,
and exploration tactics (p < .001), and with more exploration tactics
than non-functional avoidance tactics (p < .001). Another striking
finding was that 51% of all generated tactics were cooperative ap-
proach tactics (e.g., giving in to the attacker, cooperate, do as you're
told), and cooperative approach, flight, and fight tactics combined
comprised 83% of all generated tactics.
We also obtained significant interaction effects between threat di-
rection and defense category, F(7, 318) = 10.01, p < .001, ŋp2 = .18,
between time pressure and defense category, F(7, 318) = 3.65,
p = .001, ŋp2 = .07, and an uninterpretable three-way interaction, F(7,
318) = 2.07, p = .046, ŋp2 = .04. We then did simple effects analyses
to inspect the two-way interaction effects. We corrected for multiple
comparisons using the stepwise Bonferroni method proposed by Holm
(1979), which has the advantage that it controls for multiple testing
without a loss of power. In this procedure, the observed p-values
(starting with the smallest value, then moving to the second smallest,
etcetera) are checked against statistical significance values adjusted for
the number of tests (0.05 / (number of tests [k] - the number of tests for
which the null-hypothesis was rejected [x]). The null hypothesis is re-
jected for a comparison if the observed p-value is smaller than 0.05 /
(k − x).
After correcting for multiple comparisons, Table 5 shows no sig-
nificant effects involving time pressure, Fs(1, 324) ≤ 8.50, p ≥ .004,
ŋp2 < .03, and no effects of threat direction on the number of fight
tactics (F(1, 324) = 6.11, p = .014, ŋp2 = .02), freeze tactics (F(1,
324) = .51, p = .476, ŋp2 < .01), exploration tactics (F(1, 324)
= 1.12, p= .290, ŋp2 < .01), and non-functional avoidance tactics (F
(1, 324) = 2.81, p = .095, ŋp2 = .01). However, there was a significant
effect of threat direction on the number of flight tactics, F(1, 324)
= 10.96, p = .001, ŋp2 = .03, with more flight tactics generated in the
self-directed threat condition (M = 1.57, SD = 1.49) than in the other-
Table 5
Creativity scores for each condition.
Condition
Self-directed threats Other-directed threats
Low time pressure High time pressure Low time pressure High time pressure
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Creativity .46 .82 .41 .87 .20 .46 .08 .32
Originality 1.75 .42 1.62 .33 1.40 .31 1.32 .27
Usefulness 3.34 .45 3.41 .39 3.64 .46 3.61 .48
Flight tactics 1.30 1.10 1.84 1.76 1.17 1.01 1.05 .97
Fight tactics 1.17 1.43 .65 1.01 .67 .95 .57 .86
Freeze tactics .19 .50 .20 .62 .23 .48 .24 .55
Exploration tactics .12 .43 .07 .30 .26 .65 .04 .19
Cooperation tactics 3.07 1.83 2.95 1.97 3.73 1.42 3.98 1.64
Avoidance tactics .01 .11 .06 .29 .00 .00 .01 .11
Help seeking tactics .06 .24 .07 .26 .41 .77 .22 .56
Unspecified tactics .81 .91 .71 .71 .33 .67 .42 .72
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directed threat condition (M = 1.11, SD = .99). There also was an ef-
fect of threat direction on the number of cooperative approach tactics, F
(1, 324) = 19.34, p < .001, ŋp2 = .06, with more cooperative tactics
being generated in the other-focused threat condition (M= 3.85,
SD = 1.54) than in the self-focused threat condition (M= 3.01,
SD = 1.90). An effect of threat direction on the number of help seeking
tactics, F(1, 324) = 19.02, p < .001, ŋp2 = .06, showed more help
seeking tactics in the other-focused threat condition (M= .31,
SD = .68) than in the self-focused threat condition (M= .07,
SD = .25). Finally, participants in the self-focused threat condition
generated more unspecified tactics (M= .76, SD = .81) than those in
the other-focused threat condition (M= .38, SD = .69), F(1, 324)
= 21.26, p < .001, ŋp2 = .06.
6. Discussion
When given ample time to consider many possible solutions, threat
exposure has been shown to lead to a focused use of cognitive resources
to deal with the threat at hand, resulting in creative responding in
threat-relevant domains (Cheng et al., 2016; De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008;
Van Leeuwen & Baas, in press). However, threats in real life often re-
quire an urgent, single response. Therefore, the primary goal of the
current study was to examine whether and how imminent threats in-
fluence creative threat-responding. Regardless of whether threatened
participants selected their responses from a list of pre-generated re-
sponses (Studies 1 and 2) or had to think of, and decide on, a response
themselves (Study 3), results of the current studies show that they
generally preferred useful responses to original responses. Although
effect sizes were modest, we also found that people under self-directed
threats selected and generated more creative responses than those
under other-directed threats, and this effect may be due to the fact that
people under self- rather than other-directed threats perceived high-
original responses to be more effective in dealing with the threat at
hand. We did not find a significant effect of time pressure on the se-
lection of threat responses, nor did time pressure seem to moderate the
effects of threat direction. However, people tended to generate more
original ideas under low rather than high time pressure. Lastly, when
thinking and deciding on a response themselves, threatened partici-
pants mostly came up with tactics to either cooperate with the at-
tackers, fight them, or flee the scene, although the type of tactic de-
pended on threat direction (see below). In sum, whereas threatened
people strongly tend to favor useful rather than original responses to
cope with the threat at hand, we observed an enhanced preference for
creative responses under more imminent and personally relevant
threats, and identified that it is the perceived effectiveness of original
responses that mediates the relation between threat direction and the
selection of creative responses.
6.1. The bias in favor of usefulness
Consistent with previous work that shows that people have a gen-
eral bias in favor of practicality relative to originality (Mueller et al.,
2012; Rietzschel et al., 2010), our results revealed that people generally
prefer and think of useful responses rather than original responses.
They selected more highly useful ideas than highly original ideas and
came up with ideas that were much more useful than original. More-
over, although the highly original responses were seen as more effective
in the self-directed than in the other-directed threat condition, the
perceived effectiveness of original threat responses never surpassed the
perceived effectiveness of useful options. Because feelings of un-
certainty have been shown to increase this bias in favor of usefulness
(Mueller et al., 2012) and threats are often accompanied by feelings of
uncertainty, threatening circumstances may likewise strengthen the
relative value placed on usefulness. However, in the absence of a con-
trol condition, no conclusions about this possibility can be drawn on the
basis of the current data.
Future work on the threat-creativity link may include such a control
condition. This has the additional benefit of revealing whether the
findings regarding threat direction are due to self-directed threats,
other-directed threats, or perhaps both. At the same time, a control
condition may be difficult to implement in the currently used research
designs in which participants were asked to generate or select a specific
response to a threatening situation. What would a proper control con-
dition look like? One possibility is to vary the nature of the situations
people have to respond to. However, it makes little sense to ask parti-
cipants to respond to a situation depicting matching control stimuli (for
instance, a sales person holding a gun in a gun store). The (response to
the) situation simply is not comparable. Another possibility would be to
prime people with a picture (either self-directed threat, other-directed
threat, or matching control stimuli) and then ask people to generate a
response to another threat (e.g., what would you do if you would en-
counter a suspicious person in a dark alley?). However, here the threat
features of interest are not part of the threat situation to which people
respond to. Carefully implementing a proper control condition may
therefore prove to be rather cumbersome.
6.2. Imminent threats, perceived effectiveness, and urgent threat-responding
Current study findings both support and extend the motivated focus
account of threat-relevant creativity (De Dreu &Nijstad, 2008). Ac-
cording to this account, threatened people are highly motivated to focus
their attention and devote their cognitive resources to manage the
threat at hand, which results in the generation of creative solutions to
deal with that threat. Accordingly, we predicted that compared to low-
imminent threats, high-imminent threats would increase people's pre-
ference for, and generation of, creative responses due to the heightened
motivation to resolve the threatening situations. Our results regarding
threat direction are in line with this perspective: people facing self-di-
rected threats that signal higher imminence and self-relevance selected
and generated more creative responses than those facing other-directed
threats.
Previous work supporting the idea of motivated creativity mainly
used paradigms in which participants had ample time to generate ideas.
For example, participants had several minutes to generate possible uses
for a brick while they were expecting a conflict (De Dreu & Nijstad,
2008), or generate defensive tactics while facing pictures with violent
conspecifics (Cheng et al., 2016). Although generating many alternative
threat-responses is important for successful threat management, people
under imminent threats have limited time to think of, and select, the
single best response for actual implementation. Therefore, our study
extends previous work by testing the impact of imminent threats on
urgent threat-responding and providing the first evidence that the idea
of threat-relevant creativity through motivated focus pertains not only
to prolonged idea generation but also to situations that call for urgent
responding and idea selection. Furthermore, we took an initial step to
probe the mechanisms underlying the relation between imminent
threats and the selection of creative threat-responses. Findings from
Study 2 show that threat direction steers creative response selection
because it influences the evaluation of the effectiveness of the given
responses. People facing self- rather than other-directed threats per-
ceived high-original responses to be more effective in dealing with the
threat at hand; in turn, they selected the high-original and creative
responses more often. In other words, imminent threats promote the
preference for creative threat-responses when creativity is seen as ef-
fective to minimize danger and regain safety.
Based on these findings, it seems reasonable to propose that moti-
vated focus is functional. It drives people to search for a way to better
defend themselves against an attack, and the response that is appraised
to be most effective in a particular situation has the highest chance of
being generated or selected. In the case of more imminent and self-
relevant human assaults, high-original responses were more valued,
selected, and generated to deal with the specific situation. In other
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threatening circumstances, less original options may be deemed more
appropriate and adaptive to cope with the threat at hand, such as
conforming to others (Griskevicius et al., 2006). In fact, when thinking
of threat-responses themselves, participants overwhelmingly came up
with rather unoriginal but sensible cooperative approach tactics (e.g.,
giving in to the attacker, cooperate, do as you're told). This resonates
with theories suggesting that encounters with aggressive humans elicit
social fear, which originates from an evolved dominance/submissive-
ness system (Ӧhman, 1986; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). The function of
submissiveness is to deter attack from dominant individuals, and ac-
cordingly, the most adaptive threat responses would be submissive
tactics, including cooperative and appeasing behaviors. That 83% of all
generated tactics in Study 3 were comprised of ideas in the cooperative
approach, flight (“run away”) and fight (“kick in the nuts”) categories
also suggests that the preselected original responses that participants
could choose from in Studies 1 and 2 are not the responses that they
would think of and execute themselves in real life.
More generally, our findings fit the notion that adaptive threat-re-
sponding ultimately requires the preparation and execution of cali-
brated behaviors that meet situational demands and available resources
(Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). Supporting this notion, we also dis-
covered that the specific type of tactics that people came up with was
influenced by threat direction. When facing imminent and self-directed
rather than other-directed threats, participants tended to generate more
flight and fight tactics, but less cooperative approach tactics and help
seeking tactics. This fits earlier work on ecological defense behaviors
that suggests that defenders' responses vary systematically depending
on whether threats are potentially present in the environment or at
close distance and attacking (Fanselow, 1994; Fanselow & Lester,
1988): seeking help from others is more effective when the focus of the
attacker's attention is somewhere else; active defense actions, such as
fight and flight, are the most adaptive and likely responses when con-
frontation is inevitable (Blanchard et al., 2001; Fanselow, 1994; Mobbs
et al., 2015). That threat responses generated by participants in the self-
directed threat condition were less useful than those by participants in
the other-directed threat condition (something we did not find in Stu-
dies 1 and 2) may also be explained by these findings. When the focus of
the attacker's attention is somewhere else, more useful and effective
threat responses are still available and feasible.
We also set out to test the effect of time pressure on the selection of
creative threat responses and, inconsistent with our prediction, found
that time pressure had no significant impact on the selection of creative
responses. One explanation for this null finding may be the limited
number of alternative responses in each trial of our binary choice task
to choose from. This may have put relatively less demand on people's
cognitive resources for processing information. If true, increasing the
number of alternative responses to choose from would raise the cog-
nitive load and effortful information processing. In this case, people
would perhaps benefit more from having more time to evaluate and
identify creative responses. Furthermore, Study 3 showed that people
under high time pressure generated less original ideas than those under
low time pressure. Therefore, the different findings between studies
indicate another possibility that idea generation and idea selection are
two distinct steps in the creative process, and factors that facilitate/
hinder idea generation may not necessarily influence idea selection in
the same way. Future research is needed to identify which threat fea-
tures facilitate both generating and selecting the creative response, thus
improving people's creative responding under threats.
On the basis of earlier findings (cf. Roskes et al., 2013), we also
predicted that taking more time to think would especially benefit the
creativity of people with stronger avoidance motivation, i.e. those fa-
cing threats directed at themselves. However, in none of our studies did
time pressure and threat direction interact to impact creative threat-
responding. Although this null-finding should be interpreted cautiously,
it may suggest that creative threat responding is determined more by
the level of motivation to avoid or resolve the threat than on the ability
(cognitive or situational resources, including time available to think
and respond) to engage in effortful processing. Another possibility is
that the effortful and persistent thinking that is prompted by avoidance
motivation during threatening circumstances only appreciably affects
creativity when people have sufficient time to come up with (many
alternative) responses. Although time pressure was successfully ma-
nipulated in the current study, in the low time pressure condition
people may still have felt rather pressured to come up with a response
and prolonged thinking was impossible regardless of time pressure
condition.
7. Conclusion
Previous research on the influence of threats on creativity focused
on prolonged idea generation only and left unclear whether and how
threats influence creative threat responding that is urgent. Thus, the
present study examined the effect of threat direction and time pressure
on the selection and generation of urgent creative threat responses.
Results show that the selection and generation of creative threat re-
sponses was largely unaffected by time pressure, but the direction of
threat did affect creative threat responding: People see high-original
threat responses as more effective in dealing with self-directed rather
than other-directed threats, and in turn, creative threat responses are
selected and thought of more often. In short, more imminent threats
promote the preference for creative responses because original solu-
tions are perceived as more effective in dealing with the threat at hand.
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